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MORRISON V. DODD-FRANK:
DECIPHERING THE CONGRESSIONAL REBUTTAL
TO THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING
Jennifer Wu*
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has generally
taken a strict, textualist approach to statutory interpretation. As a result, in
several instances the Supreme Court has ruled one way on a specific issue,
only to have its holding swiftly rebuked by Congressional legislation
shortly thereafter. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or “Dodd-Frank Act”), passed in July 2010,
is a prime example of such legislative response.
In Dodd-Frank, Congress in essence reinstated the “conduct and
effects” approach to determining the extraterritorial application of antifraud provisions, at least as far as Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and Government-initiated actions are concerned. This provision
largely undermined the landmark Supreme Court decision in Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), decided just three
weeks prior to Dodd-Frank’s passage. In Morrison, the Supreme Court had
rejected the “conduct and effects” tests and instead relied upon the default
presumption against extraterritorial application of American laws abroad,
absent express statutory designation.
Here, I explore the roots of the presumption against extraterritoriality
and consider the presumption’s utility in the field of Securities Law. I
evaluate the application of both the “conduct and effects” and
“transactional” tests and their implications on private shareholder and SECor Government-initiated cases through the use of a series of illustrative
hypotheticals, and propose that the “transactional” test, though simple in
theory, is unworkable in modern Securities Law. I propose that,
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nevertheless, the judiciary should continue a faithful application of the
presumption against extraterritorial application of American law, as a
useful mechanism for provoking clarity in statutory language from
Congress.
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INTRODUCTION

On June 24, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a
strongly-worded opinion by Justice Scalia, issued its decision in the case of
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,1 and revived and strengthened
the presumption against extraterritoriality once more—this time in the
context of Section 10(b) securities fraud actions. The presumption against
extraterritoriality is a default presumption that American law applies only
within the territorial sovereignty of the United States, absent a clear,
contrary intent from Congress within the statute.2 This decision effectively
rejected and nullified decades of prior circuit court jurisprudence that had
weakened and muddled the application of this presumption in securities
litigation, particularly in actions with foreign components, replacing it with
a judicially-malleable “conduct and effects” standard instead.3 “Other
Circuits [had] embraced the Second Circuit’s approach, though not its
precise application[,] . . . produc[ing] a proliferation of vaguely related
variations on the ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ tests [set forth by the Second
Circuit].”4
However, this decisive pronouncement of the role of the presumption
against extraterritorial application of domestic law was short-lived. Less
than three weeks later, Congress responded to the Supreme Court’s
decision. Embedding its reply in the upwards of 2300 pages of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or
“Dodd-Frank Act”), Congress largely rejected the Court’s holding which
had bolstered the presumption against extraterritoriality by restricting the
application of Section 10(b) abroad.
This instance was not the first in which the Supreme Court ruled one
way on a particular issue, only to have its conclusion severely cut down by
a swift Congressional response shortly after. Nor was it the first instance in
which the Supreme Court ruled, more specifically, on the extent of
extraterritorial application that should be given to a particular American
law, only to have Congress respond, re-legislate, and clarify that, in fact,
the Court reached the wrong conclusion in interpreting legislative intent.
Such questions of extraterritorial application of American law raise issues
in the area of Conflict of Laws because often the American law in question,
when applied to activities occurring abroad, would find a violation, while

1. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
2. Id. at 2877.
3. Morrison was on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which had long been the leading
circuit on the issue of extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 in “predominantly foreign” transactions.
4. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880.
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the local law abroad would not.
Here, I do not attempt to give the reader a comprehensive overview of
all Conflicts law. I begin by discussing, in considerable detail, the
historical evolution of domestic conflicts of laws to allow the reader to first
fully recognize the failings and flaws of the strictly territorial approach that
necessitated the rise of the modern approaches. Surprisingly, the
recognition by scholars and courts of the limits of the territorial approach
and their willingness to adopt new approaches in “domestic conflicts”
between states has contrasted sharply from American courts’ treatment of
international conflicts of laws in various areas. This recurring tendency,
most recently in securities litigation, will be the primary focus of the
remainder of this work.
Specifically, I will review the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison,
and attempt to reconcile the Court’s holding with both Congress’s swift
subsequent response in the Dodd-Frank Act, and the current state of flux in
this area of the law.5 As discussed, Morrison is only the most recent case
in a long history of Supreme Court attempts to first rule definitively on the
issue of extraterritorial application of a particular American law (generally
finding a presumption against extraterritoriality), only to have its decision
then pointedly overturned by a subsequent Act of Congress.
I will analyze whether the Court or Congress reached the wrong
conclusion as far as Securities Law is concerned, and evaluate the
practicality of the “transactional” test established in Morrison. I will then
consider whether a presumption in favor of territoriality in judicial
decisions does a poor job of interpreting and matching Congressional intent
and will also consider the validity of using the presumption against
extraterritoriality as a judicial mechanism. The work will also explore why
the Supreme Court is holding on to such a presumption in the international
context and thus acting differently in the international context than virtually
all other modern-day American courts in the domestic context.
II.

DOMESTIC CONFLICT OF LAWS: A BRIEF HISTORY

Conflict of Laws in the domestic context has undergone several
transformations in the last hundred years, resulting in markedly different
approaches from its nineteenth century comity-based origins.6 Professor
Joseph Beale’s “vested rights” or “territoriality” approach replaced the
haphazard and often inconsistent application of the principle of comity, and
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank
Act].
6. DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA H. KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 4–5 (8th ed. 2010).
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remained the universally adopted approach by American courts for the first
half of the twentieth century.7 Its key principle was simple: “[A]ll laws are
territorially bounded in their operation.”8 These “lex loci,” or “place of
the,” principles placed great emphasis on localizing a particular transaction
of events, such as the place of an injury, or the place of execution of a
contract.9
Professor Beale’s approach was grounded in the idea that a sovereign
possesses exclusive authority to create laws to govern all events and actions
arising within its own territorial boundaries, but lacks authority to create
laws that govern the events and actions occurring outside of its boundaries,
in another sovereign’s jurisdiction.10 However, as one conflicts scholar
artfully described, “The ink was hardly dry on the First Restatement of
Conflicts [which reflected Professor Beale’s approach] when the attacks
began.”11 Professor Beale’s territorial approach was fiercely criticized
almost from its inception.12
Professor Beale’s territorialist approach prioritized three core values:
uniformity, predictability, and discouragement of forum-shopping.13 Ease
of application emerged as a secondary benefit, at least in theory.14
However, as Professor Beale’s critics had already forecasted, courts
quickly realized that the steadfast, mechanical adherence to lex loci
principles of territoriality often led to absurd, arbitrary results.15 As
technology and transportation advanced, many courts began to find that the
theoretical value of neatly defined territoriality, based strictly on state lines,
no longer held pragmatic appeal.
Parties gained mobility, and
“identify[ing] the unique location in which the rights ‘vested’ . . . was not
so easy when the transactions in question were spread across state lines.”16
By the mid-twentieth century, it had become common practice for
courts to consider “escape devices,” such as characterization or public
policy, to achieve more intuitively equitable results. By doing so, courts
creatively circumvented otherwise absurd outcomes that resulted from
strict territoriality.17 Though these escape devices were “quick-fix” options
7. Id.
8. KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (CONCEPTS AND INSIGHTS SERIES) 3 (2010).
9. Id. at 6–14.
10. Id. at 3.
11. LEA BRILMAYER, PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAW: CONFLICT OF LAWS 22 (1991).
12. ROOSEVELT, supra note 8, at 33.
13. CURRIE ET AL., supra note 6, at 9.
14. ROOSEVELT, supra note 8, at 29–31.
15. See, e.g., Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892) (denying
recovery to an Alabama employee-plaintiff who had entered into an employment contract in
Alabama, with his Alabama employer-defendant for an injury sustained in Mississippi, in
order to avoid giving Alabama tort law extraterritorial scope).
16. BRILMAYER, supra note 11, at 22.
17. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 164–65 (Conn.
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available to the courts on a case-by-case basis, they gradually chiseled
away at territoriality’s proclaimed benefits of uniformity and predictability.
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the development of
two major “modern approaches” in the United States by legal scholars and
courts.18 The first, Professor Brainerd Currie’s articles on “Governmental
Interest Analysis,” marked an instrumental divergence from Professor
Beale’s traditional approach.19 The second, the American Law Institute’s
Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, was completed in 1971.20 Both
modern approaches demonstrated an awareness of the need for a flexible
approach by emphasizing a thorough inquiry into the state interest, public
policy, and relative significance of relationships between the involved
parties and different possible jurisdictions, when determining whether to
apply a particular state’s law over another’s in a given case.21
Although a few state jurisdictions still apply Professor Beale’s strict
geographical approach to conflicts of law, variations on interest analysis or
the Second Restatement have largely replaced territoriality in the domestic
arena.22 Yet, in the foreign affairs arena involving causes of action that
often contain certain international elements, there has been longstanding
dissonance between Supreme Court jurisprudence that has clung to the
presumption against extraterritoriality in its treatment of American laws,
and an often swift subsequent Congressional reaction against such an
approach in response.
III. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS: A BRIEF HISTORY
A.

Roots of Extraterritorial Application of American Law: American
Banana Company v. United Fruit Company

In the early twentieth century, during the heyday of Professor Beale’s
territorial approach to Conflicts, the Supreme Court decided a landmark
case that affirmatively entrenched the application of principles of

1928) (characterizing plaintiff’s cause of action as arising from a contract formed in
Connecticut, rather than a tort occurring in Massachusetts, to apply Connecticut law to
allow plaintiff to recover).
18. See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 6, ch. 2.
19. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958) (analyzing a hallmark lex loci contractus case from
the perspective of interest analysis).
20. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
21. Id. § 6.
22. Because the focus of this work is on territoriality’s role in international affairs, I
will not elaborate on the variations of Interest Analysis as they exist today. For a more
comprehensive discussion of the different approaches, see ROOSEVELT, supra note 8, ch. 2–
3.
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territoriality (and its corollary, a presumption against extraterritoriality),
which had been applied in domestic conflicts of law between sister-states,
in resolving international conflicts between nations.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,23 the Supreme Court
faced the issue of interpreting whether the reach of the Sherman Act
antitrust provisions extended to activities occurring outside of the United
States. An Alabama-incorporated plaintiff sued a New Jersey-incorporated
defendant, alleging that the New Jersey defendant-corporation had induced
Costa Rica to interfere with the Alabama plaintiff-corporation’s banana
export business venture in Costa Rica through improper collusion with the
neighboring Panamanian government.24 Among its factual allegations, the
plaintiff claimed that defendants “outbid . . . [and drove] purchasers out of
the market . . . and . . . prevented the plaintiff from buying for export and
sale.”25 In alleging these facts, plaintiffs cited and relied upon the antitrust
provisions of the Sherman Act.26
The trial court was not convinced, and subsequently dismissed the
complaint.27 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
(“Second Circuit”) affirmed, and the Supreme Court upheld the lower
courts’ decisions. The Supreme Court, in its opinion, marveled at the
plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the Sherman Act, given that “the acts causing
the damage were done . . . outside the jurisdiction of the United States.”28
The Court found it “surprising to hear it argued that [the activities
occurring outside the United States] were governed by the act of
Congress.”29 The Court held that “[a]ll legislation is prima facie
territorial.”30
B.

Impact of American Banana on Subsequent Questions of
Extraterritoriality

In other words, when the reach of a statute is unclear, it should be
interpreted “to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits
over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”31 After
American Banana, courts applied this default presumption against
extraterritorial application in similar antitrust cases without complication or

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

213 U.S. 347 (1909).
Id. at 354–55.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id. at 355.
Id.
Id. at 357.
Id.
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confusion for almost three decades.32 However, the phrasing of the
doctrine evolved and, by the mid-1940s, the Supreme Court had slowly
modified the original language of American Banana through each
application. Eventually, the phrasing of the standard allowed for the
application of American law to control activities abroad that merely
“affected” United States commerce.33 The Supreme Court eventually found
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act proper when applied to
“conduct abroad that is intended to and does affect United States
commerce.” Ironically, this was the very interpretation rejected in
American Banana.34
Having unwittingly and inadvertently turned its holding in American
Banana on its head, the Supreme Court began applying this “effects”
approach to cases stemming from the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”).35 This dilution of American Banana’s
original clear presumption against extraterritoriality led to great
inconsistencies in different contexts and areas of law.
Territoriality connotes an idea of a limitation on a given law’s
applicability to the confines of the jurisdiction that had the power to create
the law; its converse, extraterritoriality, can be thought of as an expansion
of the force of a law beyond the geographical boundaries of the jurisdiction
that created it. It is important to note that in perpetuating the presumption
against extraterritoriality, courts have not explicitly held that the
extraterritorial application of American law is categorically forbidden per
se.
To the contrary, when Congress explicitly specifies its intent that a
statute apply to certain activities occurring abroad, then extraterritorial
application of the statute is upheld by courts.36 However, more often than
not, the statutory language is silent on this issue. In these cases, without a
clear, express indication from Congress, most courts have held that the
jurisdictional scope of American law should be confined to apply only to
events occurring within American territorial boundaries. This is an
illustration of the presumption against extraterritoriality at work.
In the decades since American Banana, courts have generally
followed this “longstanding principle of American law that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within

32. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law,
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179 (1991).
33. Id. at 180.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1982) (stating
applicability of Act to “[e]mployment in foreign countries and certain United States
territories”).
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the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”37 Courts have traditionally
held that without first finding clear, express intent in the legislation itself,
courts will interpret the laws to limit their applicability and effect to the
United States; in other words, there is a presumption against
extraterritoriality.38 If an American law’s application to events with
international elements abroad is intended by Congress, then Congress
should take care to so state in clear, unambiguous terms within the statute.
IV. MORRISON AND ITS IMPACT ON EXISTING SECURITIES LITIGATION
By October Term 2009, securities litigation in American courts—
particularly in cases involving activities with certain international
implications—was primed for a decisive ruling by the Supreme Court.
Morrison was decided against a backdrop of several decades of cases
where the litmus test for whether to apply Rule 10b-5’s anti-fraud
provisions, which banned fraud in securities transactions, depended on
whether a court had “‘discern[ed’ that] Congress would have wanted the
statute to apply” to a given set of facts.39 This post facto case-by-case
speculation of “what Congress would have wanted” contributed to high
unpredictability and inconsistency within the case law.
The Supreme Court issued its unanimous ruling in Morrison on June
24, 2010, in an 8–0 opinion written by Justice Scalia.40 In Morrison, the
Court addressed the question of “whether [S]ection 10(b) gives rise to a
private cause of action [arising from alleged fraud in the trade of] securities
that are traded outside of the territory of the United States.”41 In holding
that it did not, the Supreme Court sought to clarify the standards for
determining when and whether Section 10(b) should be applied to alleged
fraudulent activities occurring abroad, in securities litigation initiated by
private shareholders.

37. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. “Extraterritoriality” is used here to describe the application of American laws to
events or activities occurring abroad. For more detail, see American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (finding a narrow interpretation of American antitrust laws
in the absence of clear extraterritorial application in statutory language, regardless of the
fact that challenged activities abroad were conducted by American companies).
39. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
40. Id. at 2869. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
41. Luke Green, Morrison v. National Australia Bank—The Dawn of a New Age?,
RISKMETRICS GROUP INSIGHT SECURITIES LITIGATION BLOG (June 25, 2010, 5:54 PM),
http://www.blog.riskmetrics.com/slw/2010/06/morrison-v-national-australia-bank---the-daw
n-of-a-new-age.html.
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Securities Litigation, Prior to Morrison

The 1934 Act and its key anti-fraud provisions in Section 10(b), along
with Rule 10b-5, have been “famously silent” as to their extraterritorial
application.42 On its face, the anti-fraud provision of Section 10(b) does
not seem to apply extraterritorially, since the plain language of the statute
does not clearly state that it will. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act states that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . .
. [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may
prescribe.43
Rule 10b-5 states, in relevant part, that it is unlawful for any person to
“engage in any act, practice, or course of business which . . . would operate
as a fraud . . . upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.”44
Because Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) under the authority granted in Section 10(b), Rule
10b-5’s application “does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by
[S]ection 10(b)’s prohibition.”45 In other words, if Section 10(b) has no
extraterritorial application, Rule 10b-5 does not either. Rule 10b-5’s
breadth is only as wide as Section 10(b)’s breadth.46
Theoretically, this appears simple enough. It would make sense to
deduce that because Section 10(b) does not clearly state that it will apply
extraterritorially, it will not. Correspondingly, Rule 10b-5 would not
either. However, in the decades prior to the long-overdue Morrison
decision, securities litigation instead involved great exercise of discretion
by the courts.47 During the forty years leading up to Morrison, courts
considered the “extraterritorial application of the securities laws to foreign
transactions as a question of subject matter jurisdiction.”48
42. Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the
Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 1081
(2010).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (cited in Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
45. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651
(1997)).
46. Id.
47. Reuveni, supra note 42, at 1074.
48. Id.
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Starting in 1968, the Second Circuit adopted a case-by-case approach,
and on that basis decided whether it would be reasonable to apply Rule
10b-5 anew each time questions of its applicability arose in a particular
case.49 Under this approach, courts considered the “underlying purpose of
the anti-fraud provisions” to determine “whether Congress would have
wished the precious resources of the United States courts and law
enforcement agencies to be devoted to such transactions.”50
A line of cases from the Second Circuit applied the “conduct test” and
“effects test” in determining the reach of Section 10(b).51 In applying these
so-called “conduct and effects tests,” the court inquired whether (1) the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred in the United States, and
(2) “whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United
States or upon United States citizens.”52 The Court would then apply this
test to determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
claim.53
Unsurprisingly, the repeated application of the “conduct and effects
tests” on a case-by-case basis resulted in great unpredictability and
arbitrariness, creating “a collection of tests for divining what Congress
would have wanted, complex in formulation and unpredictable in
application.”54
However, prior to the Morrison decision and the Dodd-Frank Act
shortly thereafter, Congress had seemed perfectly content in allowing the
judiciary to continue this case-by-case inquiry in determining whether to
hear Rule 10b-5 claims arising out of allegedly wrongful international
activities in securities litigation cases.55 For decades, Congress made no
attempts to clarify the extraterritorial reach of the 1934 Act’s anti-fraud
provisions by statute.56 In essence, the courts had stepped into a quasilegislative role—this should give democratic societies pause. In fact, in the
Morrison opinion, Justice Scalia criticized the “judicial-speculation-madelaw” that resulted from courts taking it upon themselves to decide when
and whether Section 10(b) should apply.57
49. Lyle Denniston, Stock Fraud Law: For U.S. Only, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2010,
5:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=22167.
50. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Eur. &
Overseas Commodity Traders S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir.
1998)), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
51. Id. at 171 (citing Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir.
1983)).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 172.
54. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (emphasis added).
55. Reuveni, supra note 42, at 1073.
56. The potential motivations for this will be explored later in the analysis found in Part
VI below.
57. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881; see also Denniston, supra note 49 (asserting that
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Morrison in the District Court and Second Circuit

In Morrison, the key issue presented was whether Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act provided a viable cause of action to “foreign plaintiffs suing
foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with
securities traded on foreign exchanges.”58 This so-called “foreign-cubed,”
or “f-cubed,” securities case presented an issue of first impression for the
Second Circuit.59
Defendant-respondent National Australia Bank Limited (“NAB”)
“was, during the relevant time, the largest bank in Australia.”60 The three
plaintiffs-petitioners were Australians who had purchased NAB’s
“Ordinary Shares” in 2000 and 2001.61 “Ordinary Shares” are similar to
American “common stock,” but are “traded on the Australian Stock
Exchange Limited and on other foreign securities exchanges, but not on
any exchange in the United States.”62 In 1998, NAB had purchased a
Florida-based mortgage servicing company and reported the value of the
U.S. subsidiary’s assets in NAB’s financial statements.63 From 1998 until
2001, these financial statements, along with the public statements of both
NAB’s and its subsidiary’s directors and executives, “touted the success”
of the subsidiary’s value in assets.64
Suddenly, in 2001, NAB wrote down the value of the subsidiary’s
assets twice, resulting in a major slump in Ordinary Shares prices.65
Petitioners alleged that this slump in prices negatively affected the value of
their investments in NAB’s stock.66
Australian Petitioners brought suit against NAB in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. 67 Having bought
their Ordinary Shares before the write-downs, Petitioners alleged that they
suffered financial losses as a result of NAB’s actions.68 Petitioners alleged
that NAB was aware of the deception in its financial models as early as
July 2000, “but did nothing about it” and continued to misrepresent the

“[w]ith evident sarcasm, Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the Court rapped Circuit
Courts for having created, by judicial invention, the authority to decide such lawsuits when
filed by private investors”).
58. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875 (emphasis added).
59. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008).
60. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.
61. Id. at 2876.
62. Id. at 2875.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2876.
66. Denniston, supra note 49.
67. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
68. Id.
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supposed worth of its and its subsidiary’s assets, to Petitioners’ detriment.69
Petitioners relied on the anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, as well as Section 20(a), in their claim against NAB.70
The district court dismissed Petitioners’ claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).71
The Second Circuit affirmed on similar grounds, applying its Circuit
precedent in asking what “conduct” Section 10(b) reaches, as part of its
developed “conduct and effects tests.”72
C.

Morrison in the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court took a much stricter textualist approach and,
although it affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision, it affirmed on different
grounds, definitively discarding the “conduct and effects tests.” The
Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit’s affirmation of the district
court’s dismissal on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, stating that an
inquiry into the reach of Section 10(b) is a merits question, while subject
matter jurisdiction “refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.”73
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s ruling on
alternative grounds, relying instead on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).74
Once the Supreme Court decided that the issue presented was a
merits-based question subject to a possible 12(b)(6) dismissal, it considered
the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b). In doing so, it revived the
strength of the longstanding presumption that “unless there is the
affirmative intention . . . clearly expressed to give a statute extraterritorial
effect, [the Court] must presume it is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions.”75
The Court then “reviewed the sequence of Second Circuit . . . cases
applying [S]ection 10(b) to various foreign transactions, summarizing the
Second Circuit’s jurisprudence with evident distaste.”76 The Court
criticized the Second Circuit’s longtime practice of “discern[ing] whether
Congress would have wanted the statute to apply” in these Section 10(b)
securities fraud cases.77 The Court distinguished the differences between
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2876–77.
73. Id. at 2877 (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. John R. Crook, U.S. Supreme Court Limits Extraterritorial Reach of Securities
Laws, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 654, 655 (2010).
77. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the practices of using “congressional silence as a justification for judgemade rules,” from the traditional presumption that silence simply means no
extraterritorial application, and rebuked the former.78 The Court made clear
its abrogation of the Second Circuit jurisprudence’s “conduct and effects
tests,” citing among its reasons both the difficulty in administering these
tests as well as the unpredictability in their application.79
Ultimately, the Court held that the focus of the 1934 Act did not turn
upon “where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of
securities in the United States.”80 By so finding, the Court limited the
applicability of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and therefore Rule 10b-5, to
“only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic
transactions in other securities.”81 Merely because there is some connection
with the United States, for instance if one or both parties are American
citizens, is not enough to trigger the application of Section 10(b).
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected the longtime
“conduct and effects tests” of Second Circuit jurisprudence in favor of the
more decisive, bright-line “transactional” test. In so holding, the Court
stated that Section 10(b) applies to prohibit fraud or deception in “the use
of a manipulative or deceptive device . . . only in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and
the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States.”82 The
Court’s opinion in Morrison seems to be clear and unambiguous,
“drastically rein[ing] in the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities fraud
laws.”83 Because Petitioners in Morrison purchased Ordinary Shares on a
foreign exchange, not traded in the United States, they were unable to rely
on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in their claim for relief under the new
“transactional” test, and the Court held for Respondent NAB.
D.

Post-Morrison Federal Jurisprudence

While investors and courts everywhere awaited the decision in
Morrison, many other private securities fraud actions against major
multinational corporations were pending. Though not all were “f-cubed”
cases, many did involve stocks that were purchased on foreign stock
exchanges, often by American shareholders. Since the Morrison opinion
was handed down, lower federal district courts have generally tried to
adhere to the Supreme Court’s revival of the presumption against
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 2881.
Id. at 2879.
Id. at 2884.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 2888 (emphasis added).
Green, supra note 41.
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extraterritoriality.84 These courts have recognized that the prior “conduct
and effects tests” developed by the Second Circuit is now “dead letter”85
and instead are deferring to the “transactional” test set out in Morrison. A
faithful adherence to Morrison has already resulted in the “dismissal of
several significant securities fraud class actions.”86
However, the purportedly bright-line “transactional” test in Morrison
has met with criticism from other courts, for the difficulty in its application
and arbitrariness of such a territoriality-dependent test. Recall that these
are reminiscent of the criticism of Professor Beale’s territorial approach in
domestic Conflict of Laws, described above in Part II.
1. Support for the “Transactional” Test
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, several lower district
courts have begun applying the “transactional” test, which has resulted in
dismissals of pending claims. For instance, in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse
Group, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint on
March 10, 2010, several weeks before Morrison was argued at the Supreme
Court.87 In July 2010, in light of the Morrison decision, Credit Suisse
Group (“CSG”) moved to dismiss a certain subset of the class of American
resident plaintiffs (“subclass”) who had purchased CSG shares on the
Swiss Stock Exchange.88
Faithfully upholding the strict holding in Morrison, the trial court
granted CSG’s motion to dismiss this subclass of plaintiffs.89
Unfortunately for these subclass plaintiffs, their arguments and attempts to
distinguish their case from Morrison by pointing out that this subclass
“made an investment decision and initiated a purchase . . . from the U.S.”
fell on deaf ears.90 The Cornwell court cited the Supreme Court’s
“unequivocal[] repudiat[ion of the] longstanding jurisprudence” of the
Second Circuit’s “conduct and effects tests,” and rejected plaintiffs’
attempt to limit Morrison to its facts.91 In faithfully following the Supreme

84. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss and rejecting Plaintiffs’ Section 10(b) arguments
on the grounds that the foreign transaction involved some U.S. contact).
85. Id. at 622.
86. E-mail from Frank Partnoy et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Comments by Forty-Two Law Professors in
Response to SEC Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action (Feb. 18, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-28.pdf.
87. Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 622.
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 623.
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Court’s holding in Morrison, the Cornwell court rejected the subclass’s
attempt to carve out a distinction from Morrison, on the argument that the
foreign transaction did involve the “occurrence of some activities or
contracts in the United States.”92
The Cornwell court, following Morrison, stated that “even in strictly
foreign securities purchases or sales to which the reach of [S]ection 10(b)
squarely does not extend, some connection of the transaction with the
United States is always highly likely,” and found such incidental
connections insufficient for extraterritorial application.93 The Cornwell
court further bolstered the new bright-line “transactional” test set forth in
Morrison, reiterating that the focus of the 1934 Exchange Act is “not upon
the place where the deception originated[,]” but instead on purchases and
sales of securities in the United States.94 Many other courts have since
dismissed private shareholder actions as well, as a result of Morrison.95
2. Criticism of the “Transactional” Test
In theory, the “transactional” test appears simple: alleged fraud in
transactions on foreign exchanges will not give rise to Section 10(b)
claims, “even if [the transactions caused] some domestic impact or
effect.”96 Recall that in American Banana, the Supreme Court declined to
apply the Sherman Act to activities in Costa Rica, even though these
activities arguably impacted American companies stateside.
However, despite the Supreme Court’s best efforts to create a brightline rule in Morrison, certain situations have already presented the
shortcomings of the Morrison “transactional” test. For example, In re
Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation97 was a consolidated class
action originally filed in 2002, on behalf of U.S. and foreign shareholders
of Vivendi, a French company.98 These shareholders had purchased either
ordinary shares, listed and traded on foreign exchanges, or American
Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”), listed and traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”).99 The plaintiff shareholders alleged that the company
92. Id. at 626.
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2874 (2010)).
95. See, e.g., In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Elliot Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Partnoy et al., supra note 86, at 13–18 (reviewing several recent
developments in high-profile private securities litigation cases, many of which have been
dismissed in the wake of the Morrison decision).
96. Denniston, supra note 49.
97. 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
98. Id. at 520.
99. Id. at 521.
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violated Section 10(b) anti-fraud provisions by making misrepresentations
that resulted in artificially-inflated prices, which led to their eventual
financial losses.100
After a lengthy pre-trial period, the case went to a jury trial in late
2009.101 In early 2010, the jury rendered its verdict against Vivendi,
finding that Vivendi had violated Section 10(b) by making fifty-seven
specific misstatements which resulted in artificially-inflated prices during
the relevant period.102 Post-trial motions in Vivendi were pending when the
Supreme Court issued its decision in Morrison in June 2010. In light of
this decision, the Vivendi court requested that the parties “submit
supplemental briefs addressing the impact of Morrison on the pending
motions.”103
Neither party disputed that “Morrison ha[d] no impact on the claims
of ADR purchasers since [the] ADRs were listed and traded on the
NYSE.”104 However, the plaintiffs claimed that because Vivendi was
required to register the number of ordinary shares on the NYSE in the
process of its public offering in ADR form, these ordinary shares “listed”
on the NYSE satisfied Morrison’s transactional test for Section 10(b)
application to “securities listed on domestic exchanges.”105 Vivendi
disagreed, arguing that these “listed” shares were not for trading purposes,
and thus this technicality was not consistent with the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Morrison.106
The Vivendi court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, finding
“no indication that the Morrison [opinion] read Section 10(b) as applying
to securities that may be cross-listed on domestic and foreign exchanges . . .
where the purchase and sale does not arise from the domestic listing.”107
Instead, the court relied on the “spirit of Morrison” analysis employed by
other trial courts, which considered the Morrison “transactional” test
holistically, focusing primarily on the territorial location of the action.108
Though the Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify and define an easy-touse, bright-line “transactional” test in Morrison is commendable from a
jurisprudential perspective, Vivendi illustrates the narrowness of the
100. Id. at 533.
101. Id. at 523.
102. Id. at 524.
103. Id. at 525.
104. Id. at 527.
105. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. at 527–28.
107. Id. at 531.
108. Id. at 530 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp.
PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig.,
741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Sgalambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453,
487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
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Morrison holding, and the Supreme Court’s failure in contemplating the
“transactional” test’s application in other real-life, practical circumstances
in securities litigation, such as cross-listing or ADRs.109
V.

THE DODD-FRANK ACT, SECTIONS 929P AND 929Y

A.

Introduction to the Act

The Supreme Court’s sweeping reaffirmation of the presumption
against extraterritoriality in Morrison did not last. Whatever force the
Court may have intended to restore to the presumption in securities fraud
litigation on Section 10(b) claims was quickly frustrated by Congress’s
swift passage of the Dodd-Frank Act on July 10, 2010, less than three
weeks after the Morrison opinion was issued.110 To say the Dodd-Frank
Act is exceedingly comprehensive would be an understatement.111 Legal
scholars, policy makers, courts, lawyers, and financial institutions have
waded through its upwards of 2300 pages, searching for “hidden provisions
of the bill that most people have yet to notice.”112 The United States Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs issued a brief
summary outlining the impetus for the legislation to aid the public’s
understanding of the new legislation.113 Among the highlights listed in the
summary include Dodd-Frank’s new provisions to “[s]trengthen[] oversight
and empower[] regulators to aggressively pursue financial fraud . . . that
benefits special interests at the expense of American families and
businesses.”114 The pertinent section of Dodd-Frank that impacts the
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison is Section 929 of the Act.
B.

Section 929 of the Dodd-Frank Act

Section 929 has the greatest direct impact on the Supreme Court’s
holding in Morrison. Section 929P is titled, “Strengthening enforcement

109. Additional real-life scenarios in which the “transactional” test falls short are
explored below. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
110. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
111. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Finding a Good Financial Bill in 2,300 Pages, THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(July
15,
2010,
12:05
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/finding-a-good-financial-bill-in-2300-pages/.
112. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG.,
DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM: CONFERENCE REPORT SUMMARY (Comm. Print 2010)
(highlighting various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act to help the public navigate through
the legislation), http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_
Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf.
114. Id. at 2.
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by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission.”115 Section 929P provides
in relevant part that:
[D]istrict courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction of
an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the [Securities
and Exchange] Commission or the United States alleging a
violation of the antifraud provisions . . . involving—
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and
involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.116
In other words, the plain statutory language in Section 929P of DoddFrank apparently rebukes the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision, to the
extent that it applies to actions brought by the SEC and the Federal
Government. At least, this is the understanding that much of the legal
community seems to have agreed upon. However, it is important to note
that Section 929P itself is poorly drafted and ambiguous; specifically, it
never deliberately states that it is expressly reversing the Court’s opinion in
Morrison, nor does it explicitly state that it is restoring the Second Circuit’s
“conduct and effects test.” Instead, Section 929P states in clear,
unambiguous terms that any United States court will, going forward, have
jurisdiction to hear any action brought by the SEC or the Government with
respect to violations, even those occurring outside the United States, of the
anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act.117 Having jurisdiction, or “power to
hear a case,” is “an issue quite separate from the question whether the
allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.”118
Assuming, arguendo, the validity of what the legal community has
presumed is a rejection of Morrison, at least with respect to SEC and
Government actions, Section 929P extends the application of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5’s reach, when relied on by the SEC in pursuing violations
or by the Government in criminal prosecutions, even when the securities
transaction occurred outside of the United States.119 Dodd-Frank provides
that Section 10(b) may apply to such purely foreign transactions if the
proceeding is commenced by the SEC or the Government.

115. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Edward F. Greene, Dodd-Frank: a lesson in decision avoidance, 6 CAPITAL MKTS.
L.J. 29, 70 (2010).
118. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
119. Id.
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Section 929’s Impact on Morrison

After Dodd-Frank, the Act’s impact on the Supreme Court’s holding
in Morrison can best be understood by conceptualizing the Supreme
Court’s finding of a presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison as
bifurcated, between two discrete categories: (1) actions brought by private
litigants and (2) actions brought by the SEC or the Government.
Because the Dodd-Frank Act, as it currently reads, is silent on the
restriction of Section 10(b)’s applicability to private causes of action, the
holding in Morrison barring extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) to
Category (1) private litigant actions remains undisturbed. At first blush,
Congressional silence on the issue of Section 929P’s effect on private
actions seems to be, ironically, the same lack of clarity that created the
initial confusion regarding Section 10(b)’s extraterritorial application in the
first place. However, Section 929Y requires the SEC to solicit public
commentary on whether this “conduct and effects” analysis should be
extended to private actions, and file a report with Congress accordingly. 120
Additional discussion of these public comments follows in Part VI.A.
Considering the Morrison opinion together with Sections 929P and
929Y of Dodd-Frank, it is clear that the Act weakened the force of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Category (2) SEC- and Governmentenforcement actions. Dodd-Frank severely curtailed the Supreme Court’s
blanket prohibition of extraterritorial application of Section 10(b) without
clear, explicit congressional intent, and rejected the strong presumption
against extraterritoriality, specifically in cases where foreign stocks were
purchased on foreign exchanges.
Dodd-Frank effectively reinstated the “conduct and effects test” that
Morrison had discarded, at least in the context of SEC- and Governmentinitiated actions.
VI. ANALYSIS
A.

The Ultimate Significance of the Private Versus SEC- or GovernmentInitiated Distinction Might Be Rendered Moot

The ultimate importance of whether an action is brought by private
litigants, as opposed to the SEC or the Government, is yet to be
determined. As written, Section 929P has generally been understood to
partially reverse Morrison, at least to the extent that it reinstated a similar
“conduct and effects test” for determining extraterritorial application of
Section 10(b) anti-fraud provisions to actions brought by the SEC or
120. Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y.
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Government.121 However, Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act required
the SEC to conduct a study as to whether private rights of action should be
subject to the same “conduct and effects” analysis.122 Accordingly, the
SEC requested public commentary by February 18, 2011, regarding the
potential expansion of Section 929P’s application from SEC- or
Government-initiated actions to private actions and “the circumstances, if
any, in which a private plaintiff should be allowed to pursue [a Section
10(b) securities fraud claim under] the Exchange Act with respect to a
particular security where the plaintiff has purchased or sold the security
outside the United States.”123 Section 929Y further required that the SEC
submit a report of the study to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the
House within eighteen months of Dodd-Frank’s enactment.124
Among the more prominent comments submitted was a joint
submission by forty-two law professors from law schools around the
country.125 In the comment, the professors stated that, despite their
acknowledged personal differences of opinion regarding the efficacy of
securities class actions and the extent of private shareholders’ rights, as a
group they “believe[d] reform efforts should be applied consistently and
logically to both domestic and affected foreign issuers” and, thus,
“support[ed] extending the test set forth in Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank
. . . Act . . . to [actions brought by] private plaintiffs.”126
Legal scholars, interested parties, and foreign governments alike can
expect to see the SEC’s recommendations and report to Congress by
January 2012, at which time the SEC’s eighteen-month period to submit a
report to Congress will expire. Currently, it is impossible to predict not
only what the agency will recommend, but furthermore whether Congress
will take steps to extend the restored “conduct and effects-like” test in
Section 929P to private rights of action after receiving the report. It will be
interesting to see what legislative changes, if any, public commentary such
as this may yield, and important to note how the SEC will consider public
opinions such as the one from the professors, moving forward. Perhaps
121. Id. § 929P.
122. Id. § 929Y.
123. Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action Request for Comments, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-63174, 2010 WL 4196006 (October 25, 2010).
124. Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y.
125. Partnoy et al., supra note 86; see also Barbara Black, 42 Law Profs Support
Extending Dodd-Frank’s Extraterritorial Test to Private Claims, SEC. LAW PROF BLOG
(Feb. 28, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/2011/02/law-profs-supportextending-dodd-franks-extraterritorial-test-to-private-claims.html (reporting the joint
submission by law professors and its implications, on blog site maintained by Barbara
Black, one of the forty-two professors who submitted the joint commentary).
126. Partnoy et al., supra note 86, at 5.
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Congress will attempt to legislate more definitively on the issue of
extraterritorial application of anti-fraud provisions to extend Dodd-Frank’s
Section 929P language to private causes of action in the future. If
Congress does in fact amend the statutory language to apply the two-prong
test in Section 929P of Dodd-Frank to private actions as well, as the
professors are recommending, the force of the Morrison opinion will be
fully reversed and rendered virtually toothless.
B.

Pragmatically, Morrison’s Substantive Outcome and Effect on
Securities Litigation Was Wrong

As a substantive legal issue for securities law, the Court’s holding in
Morrison that Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act had no extraterritorial
application to allegedly fraudulent activities occurring on foreign
exchanges was impractical. It is important to distinguish between the
“substantive outcome” and “procedural outcome” of Morrison. The
“procedural outcome” is discussed in Part VI.C below.
1. The Decision in Morrison Was Impractical for Modern Securities
Litigation
There is a practical problem with the Court’s attempt to set forth the
bright-line “transactional” test in Morrison. Simply put, geographically
localizing the listing of the transacted share as “domestic” or “foreign” to
decide whether Section 10(b) “does apply” or “does not apply,”
respectively, is arbitrary. As discussed previously in Part II above, such a
strictly geographically-focused approach, though easy in its application,
often reaches absurd and counter-intuitive results. Potential for such
arbitrariness and unfairness exists under the Morrison “transactional” test.
For example, consider the following hypothetical scenario:127
Vrooom! Motor Corporation stock is listed and traded on
both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Tokyo
Stock Exchange (TSE).

127. Interview with Jill Fisch, Perry Golkin Professor of Law and Co-Director of the
Inst. for Law and Econ., Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., in Phila., Pa. (Mar. 24, 2011). Professor
Fisch is an expert in the fields of securities regulation and corporate governance, and is one
of the forty-two professors who submitted the joint comment to the SEC, as discussed above
in Part VI.A. Many thanks to Professor Fisch for her time and, particularly, for using this
hypothetical in explaining the concrete effects of the Morrison holding. A graphical
representation of these hypothetical scenarios in Part VI.B can be found in the Appendix, in
Figures 1 and 2.
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Investor A decides to purchase Vrooom! stock and calls her
stockbroker with this investment in mind. The stockbroker
acts accordingly and purchases shares on the NYSE.
Investor B decides to purchase Vrooom! stock and calls his
stockbroker with this investment in mind. The stockbroker
acts accordingly and purchases shares on the TSE.
Evidence of fraudulent activity comes to light, and both
Investors A and B incur identical substantial financial
losses.
To illustrate the practical realities of territoriality’s drawbacks, under
the “transactional” test set forth in Morrison, Investor A would have access
to a legal remedy in a United States court by asserting a Section 10(b)
claim, because her stock was listed and purchased on the NYSE, a
domestic exchange. Investor B would be barred from recovery. Yet
ironically, Investors A and B might not have ever realized (nor cared), butfor their eventual losses, where their particular shares were listed or
purchased. Furthermore, under the “transactional” test, the nationalities of
Investors A and B are immaterial. The test is primarily concerned with
whether the stock was listed on a domestic or foreign exchange.
In contrast, under the prior “conduct and effects test,” a court would
likely have analyzed additional factors, such as “whether the harmed
investors were Americans or foreigners . . . [or whether the] acts ‘of
material importance’ performed in the United States ‘significantly
contributed’ to [the alleged damages]” in deciding whether to apply Section
10(b) to grant plaintiffs recovery.128 The “conduct and effects test” was
malleable, unpredictable, and difficult to apply. However, at least in the
area of Securities Law, it allowed for great flexibility, enabling intuitively
equitable outcomes by thoroughly considering unique factual scenarios.
2. Morrison, After Dodd-Frank
Congress’s attempt to reject the Court’s holding in fact only further
muddled the confusion. By essentially reinstating the “conduct and effects
test” for SEC and Government actions, while leaving the “transactional”
test in place for private actions, Congress created an additional possibility
for arbitrariness in application of the law. The Dodd-Frank provision in
Section 929P, coupled with Morrison, is illustrated in the following
scenarios:
American Investor C purchases Vrooom! stock on the
NYSE. Fraud ensues.

128. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010).
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American Investor D purchases Vrooom! stock on the TSE.
Fraud ensues.
Foreign Investor E purchases Vrooom! stock on the NYSE.
Fraud ensues.
Foreign Investor F purchases Vrooom! stock on the TSE.
Fraud ensues.129
In American Investor C’s case, the SEC and Government are able to
bring actions against alleged wrongdoers, under both Morrison and Section
929P. American Investor C also has a private right of action under the
Morrison “transactional” test, because the stock was listed on a domestic
exchange. This is the easy case.
In American Investor D’s case, the SEC and Government are also able
to bring actions against alleged wrongdoers, if the SEC or Government can
show under Section 929P the requisite “substantial effect” with the United
States. Here, given Investor D’s American citizenship, this “substantial
effect” would likely be found. Unfortunately for American Investor D, he
has no private legal right to recovery because his stock was listed and
purchased on a foreign exchange, despite his citizenship ties to the United
States. Morrison’s transactional test applies, and because Section 929P
fails to grant the more flexible “conduct and effects test” analysis to private
actions, Investor D’s recovery in United States courts is barred.
Meanwhile, foreign Investor E, who does not have any ties to the
United States at all, except for having purchased Vrooom! shares on the
NYSE, is entitled to a private cause of action in United States court under
Morrison, simply because the stock was listed on the domestic exchange.
Here, the SEC and Government can also bring a cause of action against
alleged wrongdoers.
Lastly, in foreign Investor F’s case, under Morrison, foreign Investor
F cannot file a private cause of action in a United States court under
Section 10(b), because the shares were listed on a foreign exchange.
However, the SEC or Government would be able to commence a
proceeding or criminal prosecution against the alleged wrongdoers if it
could prove the second prong of the Dodd-Frank Section 929P “conduct
and effects” analysis—that foreign Investor F’s purchase of shares on the
TSE, though certainly “conduct occurring outside the United States[,] . . .
has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”130
A careful consideration of each of these hypothetical outcomes reveals
just how arbitrarily and unfairly certain private individuals might be
afforded or denied legal remedies under the current law in United States
129. A graphical representation of Investors C–F’s outcomes can be found in the
Appendix, Figure 2.
130. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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courts. After all, in each scenario, the underlying wrong remains
unchanged: fraud ensues after an investor purchases a share of Vrooom!
stock. Such drastically different outcomes that turn upon where the stock is
listed seem arbitrary. It is arguments such as these that legal scholars and
commentators have made in urging an extension of Section 929P to actions
brought by private individual investors. Arguably, this extension and
effective restoration of the “conduct and effects” analysis would be the best
for securities litigation, as a substantive area of law. The “conduct and
effects” test has its shortcomings in unpredictability and malleability;
however, from a public policy perspective, it may be preferable to the
“transactional” test for securities litigation, given the commonly crossborder manner in which business is conducted today.
C.

The Procedural Approach of Morrison, Bolstering the Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality, Was Right and Thus the Presumption
Retains Its Value

Despite the occasionally bizarre results discussed in Part VI.B above,
the value of the Supreme Court’s approach in Morrison should not be
discounted from a jurisprudential perspective. Though the substantive law
implications of the case’s outcome, coupled with the subsequent Section
929P provision in Dodd-Frank, have created confusion and ambiguity in
this area, the broad presumption against extraterritoriality remains a useful
judicial tool in spurring Congress to legislative action. Consistent
application of the presumption demands from Congress clarity of
legislative intent in drafting new laws and taking action in amending old
laws.
Consideration of these post-Morrison events illustrates the
presumption’s utility. The Supreme Court employed a strictly textualist
approach in its analysis. Congress disagreed in part and clarified what it
“meant to say” about the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b), at least
with respect to SEC and Government actions in Dodd-Frank. Congress
also charged the SEC with soliciting public opinion and conducting more
research with respect to private shareholder actions. This process for
dialogue, diligent research, and debate is a means to dynamically fine-tune
the process of lawmaking, utilizing the duties of different branches in doing
so.
Though some may argue that, in the short term, this is highly
inefficient, or perhaps sacrifices the interests of parties such as the foreign
plaintiffs in Morrison purely for the evolution of the law, over time the
judiciary’s consistent and faithful application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality will send a clear message to Congress indicating sections
of statutes that require more explicit clarification. This will help avoid
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instances of “judicial activism” and “judge-speculation-made law.”131
Although, logically, a default presumption in favor of territoriality
(and against extraterritoriality) may initially appear to do a poor job of
matching with Congressional intent in a particular area of substantive law,
it remains and should continue to remain an effective presumption for
courts to use. This default presumption is effective and desirable because
it, when consistently applied over time, forces Congress to carefully state
what it means to say more explicitly. It is for this reason that, despite swift
Congressional action in crafting and passing Section 929P of the DoddFrank Act just three weeks after the Supreme Court issued its Morrison
opinion, the Supreme Court still arguably reached the correct conclusion in
its holding.
The reasons for supporting the Supreme Court’s decision to renew a
default presumption against extraterritoriality are twofold: (1) damageminimization and (2) efficiency. Past jurisprudence has shown that failure
to faithfully and consistently apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality leads to undesirable results. An example of such
undesirable results, as discussed above, is the forty-year-old line of Second
Circuit jurisprudence in which “judge-speculation-made-law” piecemealconstructed the “conduct and effects tests” to determine the extraterritorial
application of Section 10(b) in securities fraud claims. This was the very
same undesired result that the Supreme Court originally wished to avoid in
American Banana, decades earlier, when it affirmatively endorsed the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
D.

Territoriality Is Nearly Obsolete Domestically, Yet Valued Abroad—
Diplomacy in Foreign Relations Accounts for This Difference

As discussed above in Part II, Professor Beale’s bright-line territorial
approach, though initially lauded for its “simplicity” in application,
eventually gave way to the flexibility of the modern approaches in the
domestic arena. However, to appreciate the role that territoriality and ideas
of sovereignty continue to play on the international stage, one must realize
that conflicts between domestic sister-state laws are often a matter of
differing public policy concerns between each state. In contrast, in the

131. This is not the first instance of this interlude between the Supreme Court’s first
issuing a ruling, only to have Congress swiftly overturn it with clearer, less ambiguous
statutory language. Consider Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian
American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244 (1991), which held that Title VII protections
against discrimination did not apply to an American citizen’s claim of alleged
discrimination abroad, without clear statutory language of extraterritorial application, and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 USC §§
2000e(f), 2000e-1) for an illustration.
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international arena, as a matter of foreign policy, United States courts
should not insensitively impose our domestic laws on activities occurring
in foreign countries, without very careful consideration of diplomacy and
comity. Heuristically, one would hope that if Congress had exercised the
foresight to explicitly and in clear, unambiguous terms indicate the
extraterritorial application of a particular statute, then presumably
significant research and debate would already have taken place regarding
such extraterritorial application, prior to the statute’s enactment.
VII. CONCLUSION
Where the next few months or even years will take this issue, and how
the currently pending cases will come out in light of Morrison and Section
929, remains yet to be seen. Although, substantively for the area of
securities litigation, the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison when
coupled with the Dodd-Frank Act created a flawed mechanism for analysis
by courts, the application of the presumption as a procedural mechanism
remains valuable.
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APPENDIX

Investor A
(Purchased Vrooom!
Stock
on the NYSE)

Investor B
(Purchased Vrooom!
Stock
on the TSE)

Private Shareholder (SH)
Action

YES

NO

SEC/Government (Gov’t)
Action

YES

NO

Figure 1. Graphical representation of the outcomes of Investors A and B, under
the Morrison “transactional” test.
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Figure 2. Graphical Representation of the outcomes of Investors C, D, E, and F,
under each scenario: (1) Pre-Morrison, (2) Morrison, and (3) Morrison, together
with Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act.

